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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on public utilities (telecommunications, electricity,
gas, water, transportation (roads, railways, buses, ports, airports,. . . ) and
postal service) which are sometimes referred to as economic infrastructures.
It does not concern itself with the so-called social infrastructures such as
education and health, or with the financial infrastructures. There is little
debate today regarding the fact that, when possible, public utilities should
be privatized (although several developing countries did not succeed in
doing so).1 As a result, this paper will not cover issues of privatization. It
will, instead, discuss the specific questions surrounding the regulation and
liberalization of public utilities in developing countries. To that end, we
first discuss the characteristics of developing countries that have a bearing
on the analysis of regulation and competition policy.
An essential concept in this discussion is the marginal cost of public
funds, that is, the social cost of raising one unit of funds. This cost in-
cludes a deadweight loss2 because governments raise revenues by means
of distortionary taxes. It is estimated that this deadweight loss amounts
to 0.3 in developed countries, meaning that it costs citizens 1.3 units of
account every time that the government raises 1 unit. The inefficiency
of tax systems in developing countries, coupled with the corruption that
is sometimes also present, makes it extremely difficult for governments to
invest in infrastructures and affects the cost of all types of public interven-
tions, particularly, regulation and competition policy. According to World
Bank data, the deadweight loss in developing countries is well beyond 1.
It has been estimated at 1.2 in Malaysia and 2.5 in The Philippines, while
in Thailand it ranges between 1.2 and 1.5 (Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang,
* I thank Xinzhu Zhang for many insights about the Chinese regulatory framework.
1See Laffont and Meleu (1999) for a positive theory of privatization for Africa.
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1990; Mookherjee, 1998). In developing our analysis we take the high cost
of public funds as a given because, although tax reforms are necessary in
many developing countries, it is unlikely that they will be in place quickly
owing to the many financial, human and political variables involved.
An essential instrument of regulatory and competition agencies is the
ability to audit costs. Yet, developing countries are hampered by a lack of
well-developed accounting and auditing systems (Trebilcock, 1996). This is
due to the lack of proper training programs; to the political and social diffi-
culties that hamper the payment of incentive salaries to auditors to reward
effort and discourage corruption; to the lack of up-to-date technology such
as computerized systems (which makes it harder to discover cost padding
and evaluate real costs); and to the inability to impose high penalties in
cases of documented wrongdoing (because of the strong limited liability
constraints of most economic agents).
Many developing countries also suffer from widespread corruption due,
in particular, to the low internal costs of side transfers. When two parties
(such as a firm and an auditor or a bidder and the auction organizer)
arrange a private deal, they must take into account the costs of being
discovered and the need to use indirect compensation (which is less efficient
than direct compensation). The cost of these side transfers is expected to be
lower than in developed countries because they are more difficult to identify
and, in addition, social norms may place a positive value on some types of
side transfers (for example, when they take place within families, villages or
ethnic groups). Accordingly, it is more difficult to fight corruption (Tirole,
1992).
Inefficient credit markets and the sheer lack of wealth make limited li-
ability constraints more binding in developing countries. It is important
to stress this point because many of the problems in regulation and com-
petition policy result from difficulties in borrowing and attracting foreign
capital. It is also worth highlighting the complementarity of general com-
petition policy and good banking sector regulation. When the banking
sector is inefficient and makes borrowing costly or impossible, an effective
competition policy may destroy the rents that allow firms to invest, or may
create instability.3
Other characteristics that hamper public utility regulation concern the
government. In particular, two characteristics of developed countries that
are often missing in developing countries are constitutional control of the
government and some degree of ability to enter into long-term contracts.
The lack of the checks and balances typical of well-functioning democracies
(supreme courts, government auditing bodies, separation of powers, inde-
3Mishkin (1997) concludes that “developing countries may need to move slowly in
financial liberalization in order to keep a lending boom from getting out of hand”.
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pendent media4 makes the governments an easier prey to interest groups
and patronage. The lack of political democracy and well-functioning politi-
cal institutions increases the uncertainty of future regulations and makes it
difficult for the government and the regulatory institutions to make credi-
ble commitments to long-run policies. Consequently, the economic policies
of developing countries are even more sensitive to ratchet effects and rene-
gotiations.
Another shortcoming of developing economies is the weakness of the rule
of law. Poor enforcement of laws and contracts biases contracting toward
self-enforcing contracts or leads to renegotiations.
Finally, it is essential to stress that the liberalization and deregulation
of public infrastructures in developing countries often fails to attract the
level of foreign capital that is necessary.
These features will be kept in mind throughout the discussion that fol-
lows, and when necessary specific advise for dealing with these difficulties in
regulating and promoting competition in public utilities will be presented.
Section 2 discusses the structuring of regulatory agencies that favor com-
petition, and the trade-offs involved in choosing whether or not to engage
in the vertical disintegration of incumbent monopolies between the com-
petitive segments and the natural monopoly ones. Section 3 presents the
regulatory rules required by the monopoly segments in developing coun-
tries. The crucial issue of the management of the interface between the
monopoly segments and the competitive segments is addressed in Section
4 where access-pricing rules adapted to developing countries are discussed
in greater detail. Section 5 is devoted to competition policy per se for
the segments opened to competition. Concluding comments are offered in
Section 6.
2. STRUCTURAL ISSUES
2.1. The Structure of Regulatory Agencies
A first consideration in structuring the government entity that will have
responsibility for regulation and competition policy is whether these func-
tions should be the purview of one integrated agency or separated ones. In
this regard, recent experience in Australia and New Zealand is enlightening.
New Zealand employed a very novel approach to regulation, relying only
on general competition laws enforced by the courts and by an industry-wide
competition authority. This approach was first used to regulate telecom-
munications and then power. The notion of self-regulation by industry
4See Besley and Burgess (2001) for an empirical study of government responsiveness
to media activity.
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was also introduced. In this case, industry participants form councils to
negotiate the main rules and access conditions.
Although New Zealand’s experiment was not an immediate failure, the
government recognized, after some years, that there was still a need for
regulatory control of industries that are not competitive enough. Indeed,
this proved necessary even in telecommunications, which is the most com-
petitive industry of the ones we are considering here. The concern is that
light control of the industry is not sufficient to contain abuse of dominant
position. The number of cases brought before the courts show that rapid
technological change and the technology intensive nature of the industry
make it difficult to find a firm guilty of abuse of dominant position. More-
over, the procedures involved make for very long delays. As a result, relying
solely on competition laws has proved inefficient even when these laws are
well developed and enforced. On the basis of this experience, therefore, we
can conclude eschewing regulation is not the right option.
Integrating general competition policy and regulation into a single agency
is only possible if the regulatory agency is a multi-industry one as in Aus-
tralia. Australian regulation is organized around a federal multisectoral
agency (the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission—ACCC),
specialized agencies, and regional regulation. The ACCC is composed of
sectoral and functional bureaus and coordination entities. The Commis-
sion deals with product safety, consumer protection, access, mergers and
restrictive trade practices in all the sectors under study in this report.
The ACCC was created in 1995 following the recommendations of the
Himler Report. It has taken over a nonnegligible part of the duties of spe-
cialized regulators by acquiring responsibility for promoting competition in
a larger sense. For example, the regulatory body responsible for telecom-
munications was closed after the creation of the ACCC. The Utility Reg-
ulators Forum, created in 1997, is responsible for coordinating regulatory
activities within the ACCC. The Australian case involves integration at
the federal level of regulation and competition, even if regional agencies are
also used. This system can be compared to the one prevailing in the United
States where multisectoral ruling takes place at the state level, specialized
regulation is the responsibility of the federal government, and competition
policy is dealt with separately.
Integrated regulatory agencies are attractive option for developing coun-
tries because they face a significant shortfall in adequately trained person-
nel. This is especially the case for the telecommunications, electricity and
gas industries. While there are substantial economies of scope between the
regulatory institutions of those industries, they seem much less important
between regulation and competition policy. To avoid creating a too pow-
erful institution, we would generally favor a separate competition agency
and, except for very large countries, integrated regulatory agencies at the
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federal level. The only exception might be water which could remain at
the local level. Technological intensity requires federal regulation to reduce
costs, but accountability requires more decentralized institutions.
Good advice on this structural issue must take into account political
constraints, initial conditions and industry specifics. The variety of solu-
tions implemented in developed countries and the experience of the differ-
ent Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Peru, Brazil, Bolivia. . . )
suggest that the trade-offs are complex. They involve balancing differenti-
ation versus coordination; creative versus destructive competition between
regulators (see Laffont and Pouyet, 2000); better enforcement by local au-
thorities versus better control by the government; local corruption versus
federal corruption (see Bardhan and Mookherjee, 1999); industry specific
expertise versus sharing resources; and diversifying the risks of institutional
failures versus coordination (Aubert and Laffont, 2000; Smith, 2000).
Box 1. The Structure of Regulatory Agencies in China
General speaking, China has a mixed structure of regulatory agencies consist-
ing of both industry-wide and sectoral agencies (ministries or departments) at
both central and regional levels. According to the law, the State Development
and Planning Commission (SDPC) is the government body in charge of price
regulation of public utilities. Another major SDPC’s authority is to regulate
market entry and investments in public utilities. In addition to the SDPC, there
are also some sectoral specific ministries that complement the SDPC including
the Ministry of Information Industry (regulatory agency of telecommunications)
and the Ministry of Railways etc. The later ones are generally the implemen-
tation bodies.
Another structural feature of the Chinese regulatory agencies is the hierar-
chical structure between the central and local regulatory bodies. First, there
are regional SDPCs along each layer of administrative governments. Similarly,
there are some implementation bodies, either industry-wide or sectoral, at each
local government level that complement regional SDPCs. The separation of
power between the SDPC and local SDPCs is that the former is usually in
charge of the control of entry and investments for big projects and the approval
of price adjustment proposals submitted by local SDPCs while local SDPCs
take care of smaller projects and make price adjustment proposals.
The general trend in the reform of regulatory structure is to delegate more
and more of the regulatory power to regional governments. For instance, to
provide incentives for the regions to make investments in electric power, the
central government has given to local governments the authority to approve en-
try and investments in electric generation. It also allows the local governments
to make price purchase arrangements with independent power producers, sub-
ject to the approval of the SDPC. As a result of decentralization of regulatory
power, installed generation capacity has increased rapidly and substantially so
that China has in some sense solved the shortage of energy problem since 1998,
which plagued the economy for a long time. It is also the case in telecommuni-
cations where except for basic telecom services including fixed-line and mobile
phone services, not only extensive deregulation has taken place nationally, but
also that when regulations remain, local regulatory agencies have gained much
more discretion in terms of approval of market entry and investments and price
regulations. Similar delegations have also happened in the gas and transport
sectors etc.
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With respect to the structural choice between industry-wide versus sectoral
regulators at the central government level, the trend is not clear at the moment
since until recently, the reform of regulatory agencies have focused on separating
management from regulatory and policy making functions and the attempts to
set up independent regulatory agencies in China’s context have begun only
recently. Indeed, the government just announced that an electric regulatory
agency will be created which is the first of its kind in China, at least judged by
the name and the status of it. But this event comes within a specific institutional
setting, because unlike telecoms, railways, and transport etc., there is now no
specific regulatory body in charge of electric regulation in China.5 In other
words there is in some sense a vacuum of power in the regulation of electricity.
So it is really hard to judge at this moment whether it will be another old style
implementation agency just bridging this power gap or it is going to be a real
institutional innovation which signals that the government has determined to
take a sector specific agency approach which will eventually take the regulatory
power of electricity away from the SDPC.
2.2. The Structure of the Industry
The industries under consideration were formerly public natural monopo-
lies providing public services such as telecommunications, electricity, gas or
transportation. Segments of these industries are now viewed as potentially
competitive. Some examples are long distance telecommunications service
and electricity generation. These are, therefore, the segments opened to
competition. Other segments continue to be considered natural monopo-
lies. These include, for example, the electricity transmission grid, railway
tracks, and to some extent so far the local loop in telecommunications.
These industry segments remain regulated and may eventually face new
forms of regulation (see Section 3).
Three types of market structures can be envisioned for these industries:
(1) vertical disintegration, (2) vertical integration and (3) competition in
infrastructures. Under vertical disintegration the firm controlling the bot-
tleneck (the natural monopoly segment) is not allowed to compete in the
services using the bottleneck as an input. For example, the local telephone
company owning the local loop is not allowed to compete in long distance
service using the local loop to access consumers. In the case of vertical in-
tegration, the firm controlling the bottleneck becomes one more competitor
among many service providers using the bottleneck as an input. Finally, in
the case of competition in infrastructures, competition then takes place be-
tween vertically integrated firms, each of which controls a restricted access
point and provides services.
The comparison between the first two cases raises the issue of the economies
of scope that vertical integration makes possible, and the problems of fa-
5The Ministry of Water Resources and Electricity was restructured and disappeared
in 1998 and the regulatory functions, were taken over by the State Economic and Trade
Commission, another government agency which mainly takes care of the management
of SOEs.
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voritism it raises. The bias in developing countries should be toward ver-
tical disintegration because the economies of scope are likely to be inde-
pendent of the characteristics of these countries (at least for given tech-
nologies), while favoritism is more difficult to counter.6 Case 2 and case 3
rest on a comparison of the fixed costs associated with competition in the
provision of the ”bottleneck” (like local telephony) and the gains one may
expect from this competition (Auriol and Laffont, 1992). The comparison is
difficult for developing countries where the high cost of public funds makes
more expensive both the duplication of fixed costs and the information
rents resulting from a monopolistic provision of the bottleneck.
These comparisons are further complicated by the dynamics of the indus-
try which may be moving towards case 3 as in the telecommunications in-
dustry. Then, vertical disintegration may in fact slow down the emergence
of competition among vertically integrated firms providing both local and
long distance telephony. Recommending vertical disintegration may then
be particulary inappropriate. However, for railways,7 gas or electricity,
vertical disintegration of the track, the pipelines or the electric transmis-
sion grid from transportation or the generation can be recommended if
competition in services is introduced.
In all these cases there is a choice between a single regulated entity that
owns the tracks, the pipelines, or the grid, or shared ownership of the
bottleneck by users who agree on rules for using it. The comparison is here
between the inefficiency of regulation and the free-rider problems of joint
ownership. In a country where regulation is easily captured one may favor
the second alternative, despite the lack of consumer representation that it
entails.
A particular problem for the gas industry is the market power of produc-
ers, especially when there are foreign producers involved. The bargaining
power of consumers with respect to producers may be enhanced by the exis-
tence of a vertically integrated network operator who also owns gas fields.
This argument is used in Europe with respect to the supply by Algeria,
Russia and Norway, and also in Argentina where YPF (recently acquired
by Repsol) sells more than 60 percent of the gas produced.
More generally, there is a question about the affordable competitiveness
of the market structure, given that developing countries also need to attract
foreign capital.
6This should be balanced with another consideration which is the importance of trans-
action costs which will be higher in case 1 due to the lack of enforceability of contracts
and the lack of commitment which produces constant renegotiations. See also Ordover
et al. (1994). Another consideration in small countries and some industries such as
electricity, is that only a vertical structure provides a critical level of business attracting
the interest of foreign investors.
7Except maybe where competition by roads or (for large countries) competition be-
tween vertically integrated firms interconnected with reciprocal access rules is possible.
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Box 2: The Structure of Industry
The general trend is to separate the monopolistic segment from competi-
tive ones. In other words, vertical separation is taken to be the mainstream
restructuring form of industrial structure. For instance, mobile services were
separated from the incumbent, China Telecom, in the restructuring reform of
the telecom sector in 1998. In electric power, the government just approved
a new restructuring plan to separate generation from transmission and distri-
bution even though transmission and distribution will remain to be integrated
for a while. As can be expected, this move is driven by the desire to facilitate
efficient regulation and prevent favoritism.
However, the government didn’t approach the restructuring uniformly. In-
deed, other forms of industrial structure such as vertical integration and com-
petition in infrastructures have also been implemented or allowed to exist. In
this regard, it is interesting to contrast the different restructuring approaches
in electricity and telecommunications.
In the power sector, entry in generation was allowed to independent power
producers since mid 1980s while the State Power Company owned not only the
monopolistic transmission & distribution networks but also competitive gen-
eration assets. Given the general situation of shortage of generation capacity,
everything proceeded smoothly until excess capacity of generation and capacity
constraints of transmission appeared since 1998. Then, serious problems of fa-
voritism have been claimed when the State Power Company no longer wanted
to dispatch the power from independent power producers. Indeed, the power
markets have become quite segmented among different regions and power ex-
changes among provinces count for only about 20% of total transactions which
is considered not reasonable given the huge geographical differences, with East-
ern China being the load center and having no generation assets and Western
China being endowed with much of the resources for power generation (rivers
and coal mines). Worries about the serious favoritism problem, particularly
when more stations such as the Three Gorges Project are going to generate
power soon, and the desire to build an integrated national market have con-
tributed to speed up the restructuring reform in the power sector. Recently, the
government approved a new reform package in which separation of generation
assets from transmission and distribution is one of the main contents. That is
vertical separation will be adopted in the power sector.
In the case of telecommunications, however, a different approach has been
adopted from the beginning. More precisely, competition in infrastructures was
created in the telecom sector. This has been implemented in two ways. On
the one hand, entry was liberalized in the competitive services and competitors
need to buy access from the incumbent. For instance, beginning in 1994 when
China Unicom was created, competition was introduced in long distance, mo-
biles, and data services even though China Telecoms still kept the dominant
position in local services the access of which was needed by its rivals in com-
petitive markets. It did cause some problems in creating competition in local
services, because China Unicom which can, as a matter principle, provide lo-
cal services, has until recently only deployed network in three cities or regions,
namely Tianjin, Chongqing, and Sichuan. Given the natural monopoly feature
of local services, it should not come as a surprise. However, such institutional
arrangement did achieve an important policy goal, i.e., to increase the access
of telecommunications services. Indeed, the penetration rate of fixed lines has
reached 21 per 100 person, a remarkable achievement without any dispute by
any standard. This puts China at a position that is ready for a leapfrog.
On the other hand, competition in infrastructures has also been introduced
through restructuring of the existing operators. After the implementation of
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major restructuring in 1998 in which operation was separated from the gov-
ernment functions and some services like mobile were divested, the Chinese
government initiated a new restructuring reform in 2001. The main theme this
time is to separate China telecom on a geographical basis, namely dividing it
into the South part which inherited the brand name and the North part which
will be integrated with the China Netcom, originally a carriers’ carrier and
widely considered to be politically well connected. In addition, each company
is allowed to enter each other’s territory. After this round of restructuring, both
China Telecom and China Netcom can provide long distance and local services.
Remember that China Unicom has been granted license in local services before
but it has chosen to do it only to a limited extent. It seems that the government
is not convinced by the natural monopoly argument of local services. Fueled
by the desire to create competition in local services but also worried by the
network expansion needs, this time the government has chosen this horizontal
restructuring approach which will not only create competition in the market
but also keep it viable.
It is important to note that competition pressures come not solely from
within the same industry. Indeed, in the railways, competition by mode is the
main form of competition and it works. Indeed, in response to the competition
pressures from road, airlines, navigation etc., the railways made great efforts to
raise speed. A restructuring plan is being drafted by the government to separate
infrastructure from transport.
3. REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT
The regulation of natural monopolies requires finding a balance between
efficiency and the cost of the information rents. High-powered incentive
schemes (such as price caps) which induce cost minimizing behavior yield
large rents to the most efficient firms, while low-powered incentive schemes
(such as cost of service regulation) control those rents but create weak
incentives for minimizing costs.
3.1. The High Cost of Public Funds
As stressed above, a major characteristic of developing countries is the
high cost of public funds. It is easy to see that this high cost calls for
higher prices of the commodities produced by the natural monopoly and
for lower-powered incentive schemes (high shares of cost reimbursement).
Before presenting the intuitive reasoning for these results, it is important
to emphasize that we are assuming here perfect observability of cost and
full commitment of the regulator.
Intuitively, we know that higher costs of public funds mean a higher cost
of giving up rents and also a higher inefficiency cost. However the relative
cost of rents increases faster because when an additional rent is given up to
a particular firm to support an efficiency improvement, the same incentive
must also be provided to all the more efficient firms. The optimal regulation
sacrifices some efficiency in order to decrease such rents. Thus, this is an
argument in favor of cost-plus schemes relative to fixed-price schemes or,
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in the language of regulatory theory, rate of return regulation versus price
caps.
A higher cost of funds also means that it is more valuable to price above
marginal cost, i.e., to use public utilities prices to finance fixed costs and the
government’s budget. In particular, it is a mistake to advocate marginal
cost pricing for public utilities in developing countries.
The implied difference in pricing between developed and developing coun-
tries can be substantial, since a move from a cost of funds of 0.3 to 1
translates into a relative deviation from marginal cost which is double in
the second case. Since effort levels also decrease as cost reimbursement
rules are tilted toward cost-plus schemes, marginal costs are higher and,
therefore, prices should be even higher in developing countries.
Box 3: About the High Cost of Public Funds in China.
The high cost of public funds implies that it is better to finance the fixed
cost and contributions to government revenues through tariffs or regulation tax
rather than through general taxes. That is industrial wide budget balancing
should be maintained. In the power sector, for instance, prices were used to
cover only operation and maintenance costs before 1992 and the investment
costs were covered by the government through fiscal revenues. As a result,
there was a lasting shortage of supply of power. Since then, electric tariffs
have been raised to reflect full costs. More precisely, the Chinese government
has implemented the so called “one plant, one price” policy, which is essentially
meant to guarantee full cost recovery regardless of the financing structure. This
has helped to attract investments in the power sector.
Another important case is in telecommunications in which the installation fee
was introduced since early 1990s. Indeed, about one third of each year’s capital
investments in network expansion was covered by installation fees. While this
policy has been criticized a lot and the installation fee was eventually eliminated
in 2000, many argue that China would not have been able to develop so fast its
telecom infrastructure without the installation fee policy.
Still another example can be found in China’s railways where a special sur-
charge was levied on the top of tariffs to finance the huge investment costs,
which guarantee the funds necessary for the rapid development of railways net-
works in China. Before this policy was introduced in late 1980s, however, all
capital expenditures of the railways sector had to be allocated from general
taxes.
This issue also concerns a debate going or currently about how to finance
the universal service cost in telecoms. The Chinese government is determined
to reform the current USO financing mechanism of cross-subsidization by cre-
ating universal service funds. But it has been hotly debated whether or not it
should be the business of the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Information
Industry or some other special agency.
3.2. Monitoring
The impact of monitoring on the power of incentives is quite different
depending on the type of monitoring.
Monitoring of effort generally enables the regulator to reduce the in-
formation rents and calls for higher-powered incentive schemes. A less-
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efficient monitoring technology will call for relatively less-powerful incentive
schemes. Indeed, low incentives and monitoring are substitute instruments
to extract the firm’s rent. A decrease in the use of one instrument makes
the other instrument more attractive. As a result, an increase in the cost
of public funds induces low incentives both directly and indirectly (as ex-
plained above) through a decrease of the more costly monitoring.
We have emphasized so far the strong assumption of perfect observability
of costs. In practice, however, costs are not perfectly observable and one
must also take into account the possibility of cost padding, i.e., the many
ways in which a firm can divert money. Cost can now be increased by undue
charges, which benefit the management and the workers. The analysis
(Laffont and Tirole 1993) shows that the imperfect auditing of cost padding
calls for a shift towards higher-power incentive schemes. In the extreme, if
auditing did not exist, only fixed-price contracts would be possible. Indeed
they would be the only ones preventing unlimited cost padding by making
firms residual claimants of their costs. It is therefore very obvious that
weak auditing technologies, as can be expected in developing countries,
will result in an even higher desire to shift toward fixed-price mechanisms.
This effect is reinforced by the savings in auditing costs resulting from
fixed-price mechanisms in countries with a high cost of public funds.
The impact of the lack of auditing cannot be overemphasized. It is a
crucial point, which conflicts with the findings of the previous paragraphs,
but easily dominates the other effects. In the absence of reasonable ac-
counting, price cap regulation is the only way out. It is only through price
cap reviews that some cost elements can be brought in, leading to some
cost-plus shift through the ratchet effect (see below).
Making cost information public may be a way for the regulator to im-
prove the quality of accounting by fostering more truthful disclosure of
information by the firm, establishing its credibility for honest behavior.
Box 4: Monitoring and Auditing in China.
The weak monitoring and auditing system has major impacts on the regula-
tory policies in China. For the moment, the Chinese government has chosen a
kind of cost of service regulation with strong cost-plus flavor, more precisely the
administered prices which in general have neither upward nor downward flexi-
bility. Moreover, historical cost standards are adopted and cost disallowances
are rare. In theory, such pricing policy would need perfect observability of out-
put or a good control system of monitoring and auditing, which are obviously
not available in China. Constrained by such inabilities, the government must
ask enterprises to make price adjustment proposals and then approve their pric-
ing policy. As can be expected, these regulatory policies provide no incentives
for enterprises to cut cost. But to appreciate the full impacts of such policies,
one needs to realize that, like rate-of-rate regulation, there are also lags between
price adjustments. Moreover, these rigid prices have not been fully implemented
due to the weak enforcement power of the government.
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3.3. Hierarchical Regulation and Corruption
The next point to consider is the need to devolve regulation to the reg-
ulatory agencies or ministries. A main role of these institutions is to par-
tially bridge the informational gap between public decisionmakers and the
regulated firm. This gives rise to another issue, the possible capture of
the regulatory agency by the firm. Such collusion will occur with greater
probability if the stakes of collusion are high, if the cost of side transfers
between the firm and the regulator are low, and if no incentive mechanism
is in place for the regulators.
The stake of collusion amounts to the information rent that an efficient
firm obtains when the regulator hides the fact that it is efficient. From
our previous analysis, it is increasing with the level of effort chosen by the
less-efficient firm (since it is equivalent to the gain obtained by an efficient
firm when it mimics an inefficient one). The maximum bribe that a firm
will be willing to offer to the agency is this stake. However, it should be
discounted by the price of internal transfers, which includes the cost of
being discovered as well as the need to use often-indirect transfers that are
less efficient than monetary transfers. Capture is avoided if the agency is
paid an amount larger than the discounted value of the stake of collusion
when it reveals the firm is efficient (we will call this constraint the collusion-
proof constraint).
In the simplest cases, the regulatory response to the fear of capture is
to satisfy the collusion-proof constraint at the lowest possible cost. This
includes shifting optimal regulation toward cost-plus schemes to decrease
the stake of collusion, and improving monitoring to increase the cost of side
transfers.
Three features of developing countries call for even higher shifts toward
cost-plus mechanisms. First, we can expect a lower cost of internal transfers
because of less stringent monitoring of illegal activities. Second, incentive
payments to the agency are more costly because of the higher cost of public
funds. Third, it may be politically more difficult to create such strong
incentive payments.
So far we have dealt with a case where the optimal regulatory response
entails no corruption. If we extend the framework to a case where, for
example, regulators are more or less susceptible to being corrupted (some
requiring low bribes, others requiring higher bribes), it may be optimal
to let some corruption occur if the proportion of regulators requiring low
bribes is small enough. Creating incentive payments which suppress the
corruption of this type of regulators would be too costly, because the high
payments required to fight corruption would have to be incurred even for
the other type of regulators (for whom it is not necessary). Then, the same
features of developing countries, which militate in favor of low-powered
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incentive schemes (high cost of public funds, poor auditing technologies),
suggest that it is optimal to let more corruption happen at equilibrium.8
Therefore, the effect of corruption appears complex. If we consider cor-
ruption of cost auditing it calls for higher power incentives, but if we con-
sider corruption in information reporting, lower powered incentives are re-
quired.
Box 5: Hierarchical Regulation and Corruption in China.
Regulation of public utilities has been decentralized substantially in China
both to the regional agencies and to the sectoral agencies. While no conclusion
can be drawn whether centralized or decentralized agency is more susceptible
to capture, there are some institutional factors that make regional regulation
less robust to corruption.
On the one hand, the local regulatory agencies are subject to no effective
control of the central government while the local governments can easily affect
their policies. Such institutional arrangement will necessarily cause concerns of
market segmentation or favoritism to local players. On the other hand, social
networks are more developed and effective which imply that local regulations
can be captured more easily than national regulations.
A case in point is the development of many small-sized power stations. As
a result of relaxed regulation on entry, in many regions small coal-fired plants
and hydro plants have been built. These plants with below-efficient sizes are
not only inefficient but also produce heavy pollutions. Indeed, the sizes of these
plants are in general below 5-MW and they produce on average three times
more than those produced by the more efficient plants with a minimal capacity
of 30-MW. To solve this problem and to create a more efficient industrial struc-
ture, the government has issued strict regulations to close down these plants.
Unfortunately, these regulations are not strictly implemented. To the contrary,
the number and installed capacity of small generation plants continues to in-
crease and crowds out more efficient generation capacity. The problem is that
the local governments exert their influence on the local regulatory agencies for
not implementing the restructuring policies initiated by the central government.
In some cases, the local governments simply collude with these plants against
the central government through hiding information and false reporting. In other
cases, when the central government checks on site the situation, the local gov-
ernment sends a warning in advance to the plants and then the informed plants
close the plants temporarily to avoid being caught. When the checks finish,
business is as usual.
The local government’s incentives to help local generation plants come from
the fact that local production help increase employment and local tax revenues
which contribute to local officials’ promotion. So by keeping silence and col-
laborate with local plants on this matter, the local government has an easy
life.
However, there is another factor that may counter the argument that regional
regulation is more prone to capture. This is related to the current division of
labor between central and local regulatory agencies. Remember that in general
the central regulatory agencies are in charge of control of big projects in terms
of investment size while the local regulatory agencies take care of small ones,
which implies that there are higher stakes to bribe the central regulation. In
8See also Laffont and Meleu (2000) for an analysis of how the separation of regulatory
powers may help fight corruption.
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this sense, one may argue that the probability of corruption may be smaller but
the impacts are bigger with central regulation.
3.4. Commitment
Let us consider now the important issue of commitment, more specif-
ically, the fact that governments in developing countries have even less
credibility to commit to long-run regulatory rules than those in developing
countries.
A lack of commitment puts the ratchet effect into motion. Faced with
incentives in the first periods, firms fear that taking advantage today of
these incentives (efficient firms make more money by having low costs) will
lead to more demanding incentive schemes in the future. The way to com-
mit credibly to not expropriate rents in the future is to learn nothing today
about the firms’ efficiency. Instead of offering, as in the static case, a menu
of contracts with variable sharing of overruns, which induces self-selection,
the extreme attitude is to offer a single contract which induces under-effort
of the good type and higher-than-first-best effort of the bad type. The in-
efficiency created by the lack of commitment is an inappropriate provision
of effort levels over the various periods, which has no simple interpretation
in terms of the power of incentive schemes. In the case of linear schemes
it can be shown (Freixas et al. 1985) that the ratchet effect pushes toward
high-powered schemes which create higher rents in the first period to in-
duce the revelation of types. More generally, the less commitment ability
there is, the less the regulator should try to separate types and the more
so if the cost of public funds is high.
Box 6: Enforcement Failures in China.
Lack of commitment is indeed a serious problem that plagues regulations in
China. The most serious case comes from the enforcement of price regulations.
In telecommunications, the regulatory officials openly admits that price regu-
lation is not as effective as it is used to be. Even though administered prices
without any flexibility are officially imposed, price wars are common. Indeed,
when competition is introduced, it is questionable to what extent price regula-
tion can be enforced in general in a rapidly developing sector like telecoms.
In China’s mobile phone sectors, the receiver-pays-principle is currently adopted.
But many cases have been reported where the caller-pays-principle is illegally
adopted. While the government has punished and corrected some cases, it has
not been eliminated completely. It is also the case of IP phone services where
competitive pressures have led to dramatic price cuts in comparison to the offi-
cial prices. It seems that the Ministry of Information Industry can do nothing
but to let it happen. There are also indirect price cuts in the form of free calling
times and subsidized handsets etc. which are officially not allowed. But they
happen daily.
The second case is related to the enforcement of concession contracts. Con-
cessions have been introduced in power, toll road, and water etc. In many cases
these innovative forms of regulation have contributed to the development of
these sectors. But there are also some cases of enforcement failures due to the
change of market conditions and the unsustainable terms put into the contracts.
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In the power sector, the government has allowed independent power produc-
ers (IPPs) to compete with the incumbent, the State Power Company (SPC).
These IPPs enter into the market by signing power purchase agreements (PPA)
with the SPC which consist essentially of a load factor and a unit average price
to recover both generation costs and capacity costs. When a shortage of energy
condition prevails, the PPAs are enforced without much problem. But when
the market conditions change with an excess supply of capacity, conflicts of
interests arise and the PPAs cannot be enforced. In particular, utilization of
installed capacity is much lower than the specified load factor and the bulk
power prices are also lower than the contracted prices.
The impacts on generators are different depending on the vintage of the
plants. In particular, the new plants suffer seriously because they still have a
large part of cost to recover. To make things worse, the contract structure with
a unit price and a load factor gives generators strong incentives to produce as
much power as possible regardless of their economic costs, because the more they
generate the more profits they can earn. This only complicates the favoritism
problem and makes economic dispatch more difficult to realize. It seems that
the government can do nothing about this. With the impending reform to
create competition in generation, it remains to be seen how the government can
overhaul these PPAs when part of their assets will become stranded.9
Enforcement failures of contracts have also taken place in water where conces-
sion contracts have been used to attract foreign investments. A typical example
is the Sino-French Water Company which is a joint venture for water production
with a term of 30 years between the Shenyang Water Company (state owned)
and the Sino-French Hong Kong Water and Investment Company. The own-
ership structure is that each owns 50% of the joint venture. According to the
agreement, the Shenyang Water Company should buy all the water produced
by the joint venture. The purchase price should be negotiated each year be-
tween the Chinese parent company and the joint venture but the prices should
guarantee a minimum rate of return of 18% for the joint venture. Since it was
in operation in 1996, the purchase price rose rapidly while the retail price didn’t
catch up. This caused huge losses to the parent company which made the con-
tract unsustainable. The contract was stopped in 1999 when a listed company,
the Shenyang Development Company in which the parent company has 80%
of ownership, bought out the joint venture with money raised from the capital
market. The operation of the joint venture was taken over by a subsidiary 100%
owned by the Shenyang Development Company. In the end, the initial BOT
contract was changed into a management contract.
Another example which is related to the regulation of entry can be found in
telecoms. A case in point is the so called “Sino, Sino, Foreign(Zhong, Zhong,
Wai)”controversy. When the China Unicom was created in 1997, it needed
huge amounts of capital to deploy its own network both in fixed line and mo-
bile services. At that time, raising a large amount of money through IPOs
either in China or in foreign capital markets or from other channels seemed
not immediately possible. On the other hand, foreign companies were eager
to invest in China’s huge telecom markets. But unfortunately, foreign invest-
ments were not allowed in basic telecoms services. To solve this problem, China
Unicom overcame the legal barrier indirectly by establishing subsidiaries with
9There are factors both lessening and worsening the stranded cost problem. Since
China has allowed an accelerated recovery of costs with short-term debt, most of the
costs may have been recovered. Indeed, there may be a windfall gain or negative stranded
cost problem after competition is introduced. On the other hand, because of the cost-
plus nature, capital cost and O&M cost may be higher than usual.
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100% ownership. Then, these subsidiaries set up joint ventures with foreign
companies. So comes the name of the arrangement which is essentially a way
of raising capital. By heavy closed door lobbying and, in the meantime, with
the recognition that the government has to give China Unicom some favor-
able policy for its competing with China Telecom, the Ministry of Post and
Telecommunications, the ancestor of MII, tacitly accepted this practice. But
later on after huge investments were sunk, the government announced that this
practice was illegal and foreign capital had to exit. This has caused an out-
cry. Even though the government has made some arrangements to compensate
those foreign companies that have sunk their investments, some problems have
remained and China paid its price in the negotiations toward entering into the
WTO. While one can argue that the original practice was not legal so that it
should not be enforced in the first place, such practices are not uncommon in a
country like China which still has a weak rule of law. Indeed, it is easy to find
other practices with similar quasi-legal features. For instance, the current Chi-
nese regulations require that the ownership shares of ICPs by foreign companies
cannot surpass 50%. But it is only a fact that most ICPs are actually owned
by foreign companies. It is easy to find such evidence but the government has
chosen to keep silent on this.
The lack of ability of regulators to commit can be mitigated by the repetition
of their relationship with the firms and the building of the regulators’ reputation
of not expropriating the rents derived from future efficiency improvements.10
It can be expected that this substitute to commitment of institutions will be
less easy to achieve in developing countries.
No general analysis exists of how easy commitment is, depending on the type
of regulatory regime. Regulatory institutions must be particularly scrutinized
in developing countries for their ability to provide long-run incentives through
their power of commitment, since a major goal is to attract foreign investment.
For example, price capping has been pushed in the Western world as a way to
provide high-powered incentives. However, price caps are regularly renegoti-
ated while a commitment to a fair rate of return might be less prone to costly
renegotiations (Greenwald 1984).11
3.5. Weakness of the Rule of Law
Enforcement of regulatory rules is poor in developing countries for two
reasons. First, enforcement is costly, and optimal enforcement decreases
with the cost of public funds. Second, the principal agent paradigm with
full bargaining power attributed to the regulator does not fit the reality of
developing nations. Note however that weakness in the bargaining position
at the renegotiation stage calls for increased investment in enforcement.
Finally, corruption of the enforcement mechanism itself or of the regulatory
mechanism calls for less enforcement. Thus, the weakness of the rule of law
in developing countries is not only due to poor human resources, it is also
part of an optimal regulatory response (see Laffont, 2001).
10See Gilbert and Newbery (1988) for a model of infinitely repeated contracting in
which some collusive equilibria do not exhibit the trading inefficiencies associated with
shorter horizons.
11However, one can also commit to a fair renegotiation of price caps.
MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES IN CHINA 201
3.6. Financial Constraints
Financial constraints compound the difficulties of asymmetric informa-
tion for regulation in many circumstances. The basic intuition can be
stated in simple moral hazard control problems with risk neutrality. Moral
hazard in a delegated activity can be controlled without giving up a rent
to the agent if penalties are possible even when the observation of the per-
formance is noisy. However, if such penalties are not possible because of
limited liability constraints, only rewards for good performance can induce
appropriate effort levels, i.e., information rents must be given up.
The greater the financial constraints the greater those rents. Both the
strength of financial constraints and the high cost of public funds favor a
shift toward less powerful incentive schemes in developing countries. The
irony of the situation is that, even though these countries should make
more effort to emerge from underdevelopment, inducing effort is much more
difficult in developing countries.
3.7. Summing Up
This section has detailed the many arguments that favor a move to-
ward less powerful incentive schemes (and, therefore, a move toward less
efficiency) in developing countries.
However, the use of performance evaluation to improve the fundamental
trade-offs between efficiency and rent extraction presumes a perfect or at
least unbiased auditing of that performance. The main argument against
such advice is the cost padding effect and the corruption of the cost au-
dits which, on the contrary, favor fixed-price mechanisms that save all the
auditing costs.
Thus, we may distinguish three stages of development concerning regula-
tion. In the first stage, the auditing mechanisms are so poor that powerful
incentive schemes should be advocated. They promote short-run efficiency
in activities that are immune to ratchet effects, but they strongly favor ex
post inequality (since the efficient types make more money than the inef-
ficient ones), they encourage some types of corruption of regulatory and
political institutions, and they are costly for the rest of the economy be-
cause they create a money drain toward the regulated monopolies. This
first stage should be used to develop a good auditing system. Once it is in
place, one can move rather discontinuously to stage two of development by
promoting less powerful incentive schemes for the reasons explained above.
Then, as development continues, the optimal solution is to slowly move
toward more powerful incentive schemes in stage three. The quality of
regulation in each of these stages depends critically on the ability of the
government to commit credibly to the implementation of the schemes.
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4. PROMOTING COMPETITION BY PRICING ACCESS
Let us again distinguish between the three market structures considered
in Section 2 to discuss appropriate access pricing rules in developing coun-
tries.
4.1. Vertical Desintegration
Consider the simplest case where the final services are produced by com-
petitive industries at constant marginal costs. Ramsey pricing tells us that
the access price markup over the marginal cost of access for a given good
relative to the access price for this good should be inversely proportional
to its demand price elasticity. Such a pricing scheme can be decentralized;
price caps can be applied to the regulated firm in charge of the infrastruc-
ture, relying in this way on the firm’s demand information. Of course, that
information is the province of the users of the infrastructure. The utility
can infer this demand information from the demand for access as long as
the users report truthfully the type of final good for which they use the
infrastructure.
It may be difficult to promote such truthful reporting in developing
countries when inspection systems are easily corrupted. Moreover, price
discrimination resulting from sophisticated Ramsey pricing may be manip-
ulated by interest groups (see Laffont-Tirole, 1993, Chapter 11). Conse-
quently, in the case of developing countries Ramsey pricing should be based
on broad categories of usage which do not raise complex inspection issues
and should be decentralized by price caps.
Another concern in developing countries is the market power of users of
the infrastructure. However, the regulation should not attempt to undo, via
access pricing policy, the monopoly power of the users of the infrastructure.
Indeed, such a policy requires a lot of knowledge from the regulator and
raises issues of favoritism. In the absence of long-term contracts, there is a
potential for expropriation of some large users’ investments, which is quite
negative for attracting foreign capital. In this case, other policies should
be used to foster the competitive use of the infrastructure (see Section 5).
The discretion surrounding the determination of price elasticities and
raising the problem of capture is transferred to the choice of weights when
using price caps. A nondiscretionary method for choosing weights in the
price cap, such as last year quantities (plus an exogenous change in the
level) should be selected in developing countries.
4.2. One Way Access with Vertical Integration
We consider now the case of a vertically integrated utility which provides
access to the infrastructure and also sells a service using the infrastructure
(the incumbent), and wediscuss two subcases.
MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES IN CHINA 203
Suppose first that the competitive users of the infrastructure provide
an imperfect substitute to the service provided by the incumbent (mobile
phones versus fixed link telephony with a lot of unsatisfied demand). In
this case, regulation of access should be treated just like regulation of an
end-user service, because the incumbent will be willing to provide access
that increases its business with little effect on its own service market. For
example, global price caps including final goods as well as access goods can
be used. (See Laffont-Tirole (2000), Chapter 6.)
The situation is more difficult when competitive users offer services that
are very close substitutes of the services provided by the incumbent. Then,
the Ramsey rule tells us that the access price should be high enough to
avoid inefficient business stealing and to balance the budget of the incum-
bent. One is tempted to favor a generous (for the incumbent) access pricing
rule, such as efficient component pricing, to avoid foreclosure and to focus
regulatory resources on implementing quick and high quality interconnec-
tion. Alternatively, one can use a global price cap supplemented by maxi-
mum prices determined with the efficient component pricing rule. It should
be recognized that it is a very difficult case requiring a lot of regulatory
expertise, making it difficult to implement good solutions in developing
countries. Indeed, examples from Coˆte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Tanzania and else-
where show that incumbents in the telecommunications industry are using
various strategies to avoid competition (foreclusion, delays, raising rival’s
cost. . . ).
4.3. Two Way Access for Competition in Infrastructures
When there is competition in infrastructures, as is the case of telecom-
munications, in particular, final prices are usually deregulated but the reg-
ulation of access prices remains an issue. For example, in the internet, the
bill-and-keep doctrine amounts to a zero access charge, something that is
currently being debated (see Laffont et al., 2001).
According to the literature, access prices in telecommunications should
be regulated because firms (at least for symmetric networks) can use access
charges to collude against consumers (high access charges induce high final
prices) and to block entry (see Armstrong, 1998 and Laffont et al, 1998a
and 1998b). One possible solution is to impose the bill-and-keep doctrine
because of its simplicity and because it encourages competition in final
prices.
A more difficult situation occurs when networks are asymmetric in size
or traffic. In particular, it is important to ensure that network competition
does not interfere with network development.
The regulator may mandate negotiations for interconnection under the
threat of arbitration by an international body. It is unlikely that he will
often have the information to choose access prices itself. This is an area
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where it is particularly clear that it is not enough to declare that competi-
tion is possible or even to sell licenses for competition to really take place.
The inability to ensure fair competition may even delay competition and
lead to implementation of the alternative option, that is, of regulating the
monopolist with a strict program for developing the network.
Box 7: Access Policy in China.
Under the current development of competition, access pricing policies are
implemented differently in railways, electricity, and telecommunications. In
railways, since competition in transport services has not been introduced, there
is no separate access policy. Instead, tariffs are designed that integrate both
transport and infrastructure services. However, there is a very complicated
settlement system among different administrations12 which has been used to
settle revenues including access revenues among administrations.
The settlement system has been changed several times but the main features
remain more or less the same.13 In a nutshell, in the settlement process the
revenues received by each administration are divided into two parts: i.e., ac-
cess and non-access revenues. The access revenues will be allocated or settled
through settlement prices for each administration which are determined based
on various types of traffic and also on concerns about redistribution. Without
going into the details of the determination process, we can conclude that the
access charges are essentially based on a revenue-sharing scheme which depends
neither on cost nor on demand.
There is no explicit transmission prices in China’s power sector. All the
transmission costs are incorporated into the final prices on a cost-plus basis.
The pricing mechanisms in China’s power sector are formed as follows. First
come the bulk prices which are, together with other elements of power purchase
agreements, regulated by local governments and subject to the approval of the
SDPC. Then, transmission costs including fixed costs of transmission network,
O&M, line losses, and retailing costs and cost of capital are added to obtain
the total costs of power supply to form the final prices.
In telecommunications, access and interconnection prices are also to a large
extent determined on a revenue sharing basis. For instance, termination from
mobile to mobile networks imposes no charge. But since China adopts RPP
in mobile networks, such regime is equivalent to an equal sharing of revenues
under CPP. Indeed, such revenue sharing scheme is also explicitly implemented
for the interconnection from fixed line to fixed line networks. More precisely, the
interconnection charge is regulated to be equal to half of the rival’s retail prices.
The termination charges for a call between the mobile and fixed line networks
are a little bit more complicated. For a call from the fixed line network to the
mobile network, the former does not need to pay access charges. But remember
RPP is adopted in China’s mobile services. So it is equivalent to such a regime in
which the calling party receives part of revenues just covering termination cost.
12The state railways enterprise consists of 14 administrations.
13More precisely, the settlement system in China’s railways has gone through three
periods: (1) the period of settlement prices (1978-1986), in which all revenues had to be
turn over for settlement and the settlement prices was determined arbitrarily, (2) the
period of settlement prices and double connections (1987-1993), in which the administra-
tion turned over all revenues for settlement and the settlement prices were determined
on performance basis, and (3) the period of in-administration revenues retained and
through-administration revenues settled (1994-), in which only access revenues are set-
tled.
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For a call from mobile to fixed line network, the former will pay the later an
interconnection charge of 0.06 yuan/minute (the average marginal retail price
is 0.1 yuan/minute).
To sum up, the current access and interconnection pricing is in general not
cost based. So one may ask what are the main motivations for adopting such
pricing principles. First of all, access and interconnection pricing determined
on a revenue sharing basis alleviates the regulator’s asymmetric information
problem. Indeed, lack of information on cost and weak auditing systems are
the main features of the Chinese economy. Second, these policies have a flavor of
asymmetric regulation, at least in the way that they are practiced. Indeed, one
can argue that to price access and interconnection between asymmetric networks
such as China Mobile, the dominant mobile player, and China Unicom, which
have quite different calling patterns on equal sharing of revenues basis has the
obvious objective to facilitate entry of the latter, because their access revenues
are got to be unequal. Indeed, some disputes have arisen between these two
operators in the past when new services were introduced. For instance, when
China Unicom negotiated termination charges of its new CDMA network with
China Mobile and wanted to keep the current bill-and-keep policy, China Mobile
was strongly against it arguing that China Unicom has now obtained enough
market shares which make asymmetric regulation unnecessary. The dispute was
turned over to the MII for arbitrage and a closed door solution was arranged.
Of course, one may argue that revenue sharing schemes may be more sus-
ceptible to collusive agreements which will be translated into high final prices.
But since China is still far away from well developed network competition, it is
reasonable to conclude that collusion will be less a concern than the promotion
of competition through access and interconnection pricing policy.
5. COMPETITION POLICY
We have argued that competition policy is not appropriate to deal with
the complex and rapidly evolving technical issues concerning the interface
between the competitive and noncompetitive segments of infrastructure
industries. It remains to be seen what kind of competition policy is appro-
priate for the potentially competitive segments.
Three ingredients are needed for competition. First, there must be
enough firms or potential entrants into an industry. Second, those firms
must not enter into collusive side-contracts. Furthermore, if a firm has
developed a dominant position through innovation it should not abuse this
position.
It should first be stressed that, in most developing countries, the major
problem is the dearth of participants, particularly in infrastructures where
investments are usually sunk for long periods. As a result, the major prob-
lem is how to attract local or foreign capital to those industries, that is,
how to create the conditions that make investment attractive. The work
required to favor entry is not the usual task of a competition agency. Un-
fortunately, it concerns most of the characteristics of developing countries
that were discussed earlier and which cannot be easily resolved: inefficient
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financial sectors, lack of credibility of institutions, lack of enforcement of
laws, inefficient transportation and communications, lack of information
available to consumers, etc., what Carlin and Seabright (2000) refer to as
“competitive infrastructure”.
This is particularly the case in infrastructures where technologies favor
high concentration and international trade cannot be relied upon to create
competitive pressures. The difficult question is: which rate of return will
attract the optimal level of investment? If this optimal rate were known,
competition policy should ensure this rate and no more. Probably, this can
be achieved more easily through concession contracts with regulated prices
than with competition in infrastructures.
More traditional competition policy can be relied upon in the case of
the competitive use of infrastructure. As observed by Rey (1997), col-
lusion is facilitated by entry barriers, market concentration and capacity
constraints, and these factors are more likely to be present in developing
countries. As already observed, the transaction costs of collusion are also
likely to be lower in LDCs. Similarly, predatory strategies may be partic-
ularly dangerous in countries where credit markets are weak. Rey (1997)
argues also that the high entry barriers often found in developing countries
give more force to the market foreclosure argument when discussing the
essential facility doctrine. He also recommends a more cautious attitude
toward vertical restraints.
Competition policy during the liberalization process should apply to the
competitive segments of the deregulated industry; namely, generation in
electricity, long distance service in telecommunication, and operating ser-
vices in transportation. This is particularly important in developing coun-
tries where attracting capital for infrastructure investment generally re-
quires giving sizeable market shares to investing firms.
In particular, merger and acquisition rules in developing countries must
be designed with an emphasis on simplicity, nondiscretion, and adaptability
to the rapidly changing market structures. One possibility is to establish
explicit market share constraints (foregoing efficiency arguments), which
are revised periodically.
Some industries may need more innovative combinations of regulation
and competition. For example, under normal conditions, the electricity
industry may be appropriately competitive and need only the oversight of
competition authorities. However, when capacity constraints are binding,
either under conditions of peak demand or because of supply shocks, gen-
eration firms may enjoy such power in local markets that price regulation
becomes necessary.
More generally, the difficulty to attract capital generates market struc-
tures that are imperfectly competitive and calls for a more intrusive regu-
lation of conduct than classical competition policy. It also creates conflicts
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between privatization committees or regulatory institutions, which are well
aware of the constraints on competition imposed by the need to attract
capital, and the competition authorities, which ex post tend to breach the
explicit or implicit agreements that restrict competition.
In any case, it should be clear that US-style competition policy (with
its armada of lawyers and economists) is neither affordable nor achievable
in developing countries. Designing simple and transparent rules for these
countries, particularly to prevent horizontal collusion and abuse of domi-
nant position, remains a worthy task. Nevertheless, the benefits that can be
expected from competition policy are quite small in the foreseeable future
for several reasons.
The lack of adequately trained staff is particularly acute, in view of the
complexities and ambiguities of the economic analysis of such questions
as predatory behavior and vertical restraints. Emerging industries will be
necessarily highly monopolistic and interest groups will have considerable
potential for interference.
Yet, competition agencies should be developed. Their first major goal is
to play an educational role by advocating the social benefits of fair com-
petition and concentrating on specific goals. For example, competition is
weak in developing countries because transactions are localized as a re-
sult of poor communications systems and inefficient trading organizations.
Focusing attention on these areas should be particularly fruitful.
Finally, in pushing for competition in infrastructures it must be remem-
bered that a major goal is to achieve greater population coverage in access
to basic public services. Monopoly provision which allowed cross-subsidies,
when properly14 used, was a powerful redistributive instrument. Com-
petition makes redistribution via prices more difficult, and there are not
always easy substitutes, in countries with very inefficient and often corrupt
tax systems (Laffont and N’Gbo, 2000, and Gasmi et alii 2002). Then, it
may be easier to achieve universal service obligations within a concession
contract than through oligopolistic competition
Box 8: Competition Policy in China.
It is argued in China that competition policy is less relevant in developing
economies because on the one hand, natural monopolies are taken care of by
regulation, and on the other hand, there is no meaningful market power cre-
ated by any enterprise’s dominant position which is the purview of competition
authority. Indeed, most Chinese firms are still small in comparison with big
names of multinationals. While the view may underestimate the role of com-
petition policy, it does point out the important fact that competition policy
may have different dimensions in developing countries and one has to take into
account the institutional features in China. But since competition policy in-
14In addition to favoritism and rent-seeking, cross-subsidies may induce inefficient
bypass and create poor incentives for service quality provision and proper coverage of
under priced consumers.
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cludes the promotion of fair competition, let us focus on the anti-trust aspect
of competition policy.
The most important problem of competition policy in China’s context is the
so called administrative monopoly which means that market power is usually
created by the abuse of administrative power. The unduly exertion of admin-
istrative power, whether by ministries or local governments, is meant to create
entry barriers which will segment the market, in particular the segmentation of
local markets. Indeed, many cases have been reported on this. For instance, in
the power sector, power exchanges are not actively transacted because of local
governments’ influence. Actually, the issue here is not a matter of competition
policy but how to solve the conflict of interests and counter the abuse of power
by the local governments.
Another feature of competition policy is it has to deal with price wars among
SOEs. In other words, predation strategy is more relevant in China’s case. For
instance, price wars are so fierce in the airline industry that price regulation
cannot be seriously implemented even though the government tried various ways
to curb them. In telecoms, price cuts, directly or indirectly, are often observed.
While it may be difficult to judge whether it is a real competition policy problem
or a soft budget problem which is typical of SOEs, these problems do raise an
important question: to what extent competition can be introduced without
ownership reform?
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has highlighted the departures from developed countries prac-
tices that are required in developing countries on the basis of normative
economic theory. However, a number of caveats must be borne in mind.
First, more empirical work is needed to more precisely characterize the
specific features of developing countries that are relevant for regulatory eco-
nomics. Such work should naturally lead to distinguishing various stages
of development and to obtaining a classification of countries requiring dif-
ferentiated policies.
Second, even though we have mentioned some characteristics of govern-
ments, a broader political economy of reform, taking into account specific
historical and political situations is necessary.
Third, liberalization, competition and regulatory policies are very recent
developments, especially in the very poor countries. The empirical evidence
is limited and not of easy access. Moreover, it is never in a form that
would allow rigorous econometric tests. Case studies and theory are the
only available tools that can be used under these circumstances, but this
should be done with a lot of caution, in particular because the economic
theory relevant for developing countries is so far only sketchy.
Nevertheless, we hope that this paper provides a useful framework for
those who have the difficult task of advising developing country authorities
on more efficient ways of providing public services.
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